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Introduction 
Since the beginning of the current debt crises in some Southern European countries, economists and 
policymakers have been looking for prompt and forceful responses to restore confidence and avoid a 
continued spread of the crisis. Among the proposals being brought, economists have considered a 
more active and systematic role by the IMF as a direct lender of last resort and as a monitoring agent 
on fiscal programs aiming to restore the budget equilibrium of countries in financial distress.2 Other, 
related proposals had already advanced the idea of IMF-supported bond issues, in which the 
international organization would act as a guarantor for countries perceived as risky, thereby accessing 
external funds at lower interest rates.  
This paper looks at a previous experience in which an international crisis impeded access to 
international capital markets for countries in a deplorable financial situation. After WWI, countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe had to be reconstructed and the world economy suffered from a severe 
crisis. International trade had shrunk to minimum levels and international capital flows had completely 
dried up. International cooperation, which had smoothly restarted by 1919, both at official and 
informal levels, tried to overcome these difficulties through a number of channels, one of which was 
the creation of the Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations (EFO) in November 
1920. Among the different functions pursued by this innovative body, a main issue concerned the 
reactivation of long-term credit for reconstruction and development purposes. Among the outcomes 
were loans contracted on behalf of Eastern and Central European countries, issued under the auspices 
of the League of Nations—a premiere in the history of finance.  
The literature on these “League loans”, as they would later be known, remains skeptical about 
the success of the initiative. The most critical authors argue that most of these loans did not escape the 
destiny of most foreign loans issued during the 1920s, which was plain default. However, qualifying 
this attempt as a failure because it could not avoid the hostile environment of the 1930s overlooks 
several important elements related to the legacy of the experience. Historians and political scientists 
have advanced some of these elements. Probably the most important has been the recognition of the 
League loans as the first time in history where an international organization directly intervened and 
supported the world’s economic activity on a major scale. As the timing of this ex-post discussion 
informs us, the League loans episode was in vogue during the conceptual shaping of Bretton Woods 
Institutions after WWII. Indeed, many of the tasks which are embraced by the IMF today were already 
well known by its League of Nations predecessors, such as the production of economic information, 
advising on economic and financial matters and supporting short- and long-term credit by the 
promotion of international cooperation. 
In this paper we argue that a major and yet underemphasized success of the League loans was 
their ability to provide countries that would have otherwise remained isolated access to financial 
markets. This was done without a pool of capital at the League’s disposal, and without any previous 
agreement with other creditors. In this sense, the League acted as a “money doctor” that provided a 
seal of approval to the loans it promoted. But contrary to any traditional money doctor, it pursued a set 
of functions beyond advising and providing medicine. It was a public and multinational entity, and this 
allowed it to have a larger scope for intervention and to overcome political obstacles. This was a novel 
and major item as national rivalries were a thriving fact in the 1920s, and governments were hostile to 
capital exports. Moreover, the League was also in charge of the monitoring of the reconstruction plans, 
the management of the proceeds from the loans, the normative that helped define the loans' terms and 
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even supplying a detailed procedure in the event of default. In other words, whereas the power of a 
traditional money doctor was to provide automatic or quasi-automatic access to external funds, with 
the League this was not the case. The League's main function (from which all other functions 
originate) was the procurement of support from creditor governments and underwriting banks for each 
of the loans it backed. If necessary, the League could interact with central banks in creditor countries, 
obtain further guarantees from borrowing governments and provide arbitration functions in case of 
disputes. But the success of a loan issue, and to some extent the costs for the funds, remained within 
the sphere of the market.  
 This subtlety has strong implications. To the extent that the League provided the technical and 
moral support to an economic program, this necessarily involved costs for a government in terms of 
loss of sovereignty and decision-making power. However, because the League did not itself lend nor 
actively participate in financial markets, the advantages of such a procedure were far from 
straightforward. One of the advantages, which has been advanced in the literature, concerns the 
credibility gained through the implication of the League in an economy’s reform program (Santaella, 
1993). A government's announcement of an economic policy would thereby avoid a problem of time 
inconsistency—whereby a government has an incentive to renege on an announced policy—by 
reaching a binding commitment through the involvement of an external agent. This was done through 
close monitoring and joint work with local authorities. An ex-post perspective on these programs 
demonstrates that they were successful in terms of macroeconomic achievements.  
Nevertheless, this macroeconomic perspective  misses some crucial aspects regarding the 
construction of the external agent's own credibility. The stabilization programs supported by the 
League could only succeed after a previous and essential phase that was related to the securing of 
financial resources - from private capital markets- most often before the program was set in place. The 
League was therefore responsible for securing necessary credibility in the eyes of investors and 
contemporary agents, and this was ex-ante a different and major issue. Moreover, from our narrative it 
seems clear that the first countries turning to the League for assistance did so because they had no 
other choice. Countries seeking financial support would have first tried to tap funds through the 
support of other governments’ and banks' loans, mainly in the form of short-term credits. Because it 
was impossible or very difficult for them to issue a long-term loan in international financial markets, 
they were obliged to pass through the League. This was a joint decision between policymakers and 
central bankers from creditor countries that did not necessarily depend only on market factors.  
The role of the League thus contrasts with the role played today by the IMF. Whereas the 
current literature debates the “catalyzing” role of the IMF in attracting capital flows to countries in 
financial distress, the League adopted this role as the most important aspect of its countries’ support 
policies precisely due to its own lack of capital. Moreover, the channels identified in the literature 
through which the IMF may achieve this catalyzing role are diverse but hardly transposable to the 
League's case. A first channel is the change in the economic policy behavior adopted by one country, 
thereby providing access to IMF loans and facilitating access to private capital. A second channel 
considers the importance of the informational role of the IMF, as it would act as a delegated monitor.3 
Finally, these channels are supposed to have a non-linear impact on borrowing countries. IMF-support 
would have no catalyzing effects for those countries in a highly illiquid or insolvent position because 
restoration to normal levels has a low probability. Vulnerable but rescuable countries have the most to 
gain, whereas well-behaved countries would obtain no benefit from IMF programs.  
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These empirical findings are in sharp contrast with the League loans. Precisely because an 
announcement of regime change was supposed to be accompanied by a long-term loan, tapping for 
financial funds often occurred before the economic policy regime actually took place. The credibility 
problem was therefore transferred to the League, which, as a new actor in the international scene, was 
expected to gain through the results it achieved. A further difficulty concerns the fact that countries 
seeking the League's support were those that were the most vulnerable, those to which private 
financiers would not lend or would do so only by imposing very high interest rates. The non-linearity 
prediction about IMF programs would therefore not apply to the League case. Finally, because the 
League of Nations did not lend nor was it in a position to provide an explicit guarantee to the loans 
issued under its administration, its support was only intended to foster the economic reform programs 
and improve the macroeconomic position of borrowing countries, which would then be able to gain 
access to financial markets on their own in the future. 
It is therefore necessary to look at the precise conditions under which the League loans were 
issued. We describe how the borrowers' credibility problem was solved, and how countries in financial 
distress could finally access capital markets. We also compare this with other cases of borrowing 
countries that tapped for external resources for reconstruction or stabilization purposes without the 
Leagues' support. An obvious yet secondary issue is the measurement of the League's added value. We 
demonstrate through historical counterfactuals that the mere possibility of issuing a loan was already a 
huge gain for borrowing countries. Besides, the League prioritized a favorable pricing of the bonds it 
backed. This was achieved thanks to the success of the first loans that increased the bargaining power 
of the League in its negotiations with underwriting banks. In other words, while novelty and adverse 
market conditions reduced the possibility of bargaining borrowing terms for the first loans, the League 
succeeded in improving the borrowing terms of the last loans it supported. Finally, we differentiate 
(primary) market access terms with the evolution of secondary market prices, which were determined 
more by macroeconomic achievements than by the mere presence of the League's representatives in 
borrowing countries. As we shall demonstrate, the monitoring role of the League was an important 
part of the League's work. But it also had its own limitations as shown in subsequent periods, when a 
sudden and violent shock hit both lenders and borrowers (the effects of the great depression) and the 
League could not act as a lender of last resort. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the first section we provide a literature review on the 
works dealing with the League loans. We then analyze the historical context and present the League 
loans as the outcome of several years of failed attempts of international cooperation to promote 
international trade and economic activity. In the third section we look at the functioning of the League 
loans, and present some empirical evidence on the conditions under which these loans were launched. 
In the fourth section we compare the League loans with other reconstruction loans and provide some 
counterfactual cases of countries that refused the League's conditions and remained excluded from 
financial markets. In the fifth section we provide a principal component analysis to test whether the 
League loans were different than the rest. We conclude in the last section. 
 
Literature review 
The League loans have been studied in different contexts and through different perspectives. The 
League itself published a number of studies providing a precise description of the proceedings and 
methods used and the successes achieved, while also recurrently signaling the mistakes and problems 
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encountered by the League and by governments receiving its support.4 Legal studies have looked at 
the novelties in terms of debt contracts, such as the inclusion of arbitration clauses and the problems 
related to currency clauses.5 These studies also looked at the experience of the League in dealing with 
defaults. Other studies analyzing international investment in the 1930s also looked at the League 
experience. For instance, the Royal Institute of International Affairs emphasized that countries 
receiving League loans would “have found it impossible to borrow abroad by any other method”.6 The 
study emphasized other positive elements such as the precedent setting of international financial 
cooperation or the general supervision successfully pursued by the League. This supervision was 
different from the traditional practice of having borrowers and lenders directly linked. The report also 
mentioned that all loans had been successfully placed in the markets. It concludes somewhat 
idealistically that the success of this experience was only possible due to the good faith of the League, 
the borrowers and the lenders. 
  After WWII, Myers’ seminal paper looked at the experience of the League loans at a time 
when Bretton Woods institutions were still under construction. It provided a detailed description of 
each loan and the policy recommendations on a case by case basis. Myers stressed the importance of 
the League as the organization embodying the cooperation efforts which led to the reconstruction of 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, Myers accurately forecasted the challenges that 
the Bank for Reconstruction and Development would face. Discussing the relative success of the 
loans, Myers showed that they allowed countries to reestablish the productive basis of their 
economies, but qualifies her conclusions by acknowledging that most of the loans and the stabilization 
they permitted did not prevent the economic debacle of the 1930s.7  
Borchard described the experience of League loans from a legal perspective in terms of 
bondholders' protection and control mechanisms, and acknowledged the work of the EFO as inspiring 
“investors with confidence”, though he also highlighted the fact that all the borrowers except Estonia 
defaulted on their loans.8 Piétri focused on the League of Nation's role in the reconstruction of Austria. 
She provided a detailed description of the diplomatic work of the League, and accorded the Austrian 
loan of 1923 (the first League loan) a prominent role in the opening of American financial markets to 
reconstruction loans for other European countries. 9 However, Piétri argued that the macroeconomic 
stabilization that Austria achieved was unstable and unable to reduce both the persistent high 
unemployment rates and the country's large trade deficits. Therefore, the economy remained 
vulnerable to external shocks.10 Finally, Mouton revisited this experience taking into account the 
French perspective and the main results achieved at the Brussels' international conference, which 
paved the way for future international cooperation, with the League loans as one of the main 
outcomes. 11 
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Eichengreen argued that after WWI, there were two main impediments to international 
lending. 12 On the one hand, the reparations problem led to a debt overhang for borrowing countries, 
impeding their access to new loans in international capital markets. On the other hand, the disruption 
of international trade impeded these countries' economic recovery. The League loans, as part of an 
effort by creditor countries to foster economic recovery, succeeded by having a catalytic impact on 
lending to Europe.13 Eichengreen's first analyses on the League loans were published at the time in the 
1980s when American authorities were discussing the possibilities of giving financial market access to 
defaulting Latin American governments, and the findings suggested that these kinds of interventions 
could facilitate foreign investment to former defaulters. 
Santaella tested the impact of the League loans in terms of macroeconomic performance and 
external enforcement. He gave theoretical and empirical evidence showing that the League provided 
the credibility necessary for borrowing countries to engage in macroeconomic reforms. For this 
author, countries subject to League of Nations' monitoring succeeded in introducing economic and 
institutional reforms. They all stabilized their currencies, established or reformed their central banks, 
and improved their fiscal balances. Echoing Eichengreen, Santaella also stated that the League served 
as an external agent which played a “catalytic role in mobilizing other credits”. 14  
Emphasizing the role of the EFO as a potential ancestor of the IMF, Pauly outlined the role 
played by the financial committee's members in setting up the League loans used for the 
reconstruction schemes in Austria and Hungary. 15 He described the intervention by the League as 
comparatively more “intrusive” than today's IMF financing programs.16 Schuker focused on the role of 
the League of Nations as a money doctor, who cooperated and occasionally competed with other 
money doctors of the period and described the conditionality applied to the League loans.17 He 
enumerated the first attempts by the League of Nations to promote international credit and trade, and 
described how these propositions failed one after the other. The author called this "the limitations of 
multilateralism".18 As the League was also unable to prevent capital flight and defaults in the 1930s, 
he considered the League reconstruction programs to be failures.  
More recently, Fior revisited the League's role in the 1920s reconstruction of Europe, and 
argued that the League loans could be considered a success in different aspects. 19 First, the author 
estimated that 42% of the total amount of loans issued for reconstruction purposes in the main 
financial centers of Europe and on Wall Street were supported by the League.20 Second, the League of 
Nations developed a pioneer process of international cooperation, which was to be followed in other 
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cases beyond the League such as the stabilization programs of Germany (1924), Belgium (1926), Italy 
(1927), Poland (1927) and Romania (1929).21 Beyersdorf has challenged the criticism advanced by 
some authors of the supposedly biased work of the League's financial experts as responding more to 
Anglo-American banking interests than to those of debtor countries, in particular Austria.22 Beyersdorf 
demonstrated that international cooperation was necessary for the success of international loans, and 
described how banks and policymakers in all creditor countries were consulted in order to organize 
Austria's reconstruction program by establishing economic orthodoxy.  
Summing up, the literature remains inconclusive about the final balance of the League loans. 
Those looking at the glass half-full emphasize their catalytic impact by opening up financial markets 
to other European borrowers. Some scholars also present this experience as an example of 
international cooperation and as a model for the Bretton Woods institutions. Those who view the glass 
as half-empty question the final result in terms of macroeconomic stability and returns to investors, as 
most of these loans defaulted. We now aim to describe the context and manner through which the 
League loans were conceived. In a context of world economic distress and urgent financial needs, 
efforts for international cooperation failed systematically. The League loan experience thus emerged 
as the only far-reaching effort whose final impact deserves a definitive analysis of its successes and 
limitations.  
 
Historical Background and League loans’ origins 
In 1919, Europe was still suffering from the wounds of the conflict. In addition to having to manage 
the consequent financial difficulties and physical destruction of the war, new challenges emerged with 
the integration of the newly created states of Central Europe. Among these challenges, a major issue 
concerned the integration of these new countries into the world economy by fostering international 
trade on the one hand and by creating access to capital markets on the other. Most of those countries 
had to build up their productive activities and set up stable monetary and fiscal systems, for which 
foreign investment was necessary.  
A major impediment was the fact that conditions in the rest of Europe did not look much 
better. Inflation was a major problem in many economies, most notably in Germany. Ritschl and 
Straumann estimated the level of German prices in late 1919 and early 1920 at about ten times their 
levels in 1914. 23 Most European countries experienced a strong inflationary process inherited from 
war finance necessities, aggravated in many instances by tax systems that proved deficient in financing 
the unprecedented costs of the First World War, as well as new customs borders and a decline in 
international trade.24  One of the most urgent cases was Austria, where the situation was even worse 
than in Germany, with rampant hyperinflation following immediately upon the war's end. At the other 
extreme, Bulgaria registered an inflation rate of “only”  21% between 1919 and 1920.25 According to 
Kindleberger, Great Britain seemed at first to manage the transition period rather well , but the general 
situation among its main trading partners was a major concern for the exporting and financial 
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sectors.26 This same concern was shared among American bankers, who were already increasingly 
involved in European affairs before WWI.27  
It is therefore unsurprising that the first attempts to unblock this tragic situation originated 
from US banks in early 1919.28 Among them, the first came from Frank Vanderlip, President of the 
National City Bank of New York, who put forward the idea of “the formation of a consortium of 
international banks, appointed and backed by the governments of the United States and of other 
nations which exported significant amounts to Europe”29 to float an international loan to help 
European countries to get new credit. Vanderlip's proposition was very badly received by the French 
finance ministry, mainly due to its implications in terms of foreign government control through an 
international commission.30 To this resistance was added that of the US government itself, which was 
reluctant to issue any new loan to European countries, thus causing its definitive dismissal. A second 
competing proposition was advanced by the bank J.P. Morgan (later characterized as the “Davison 
plan” by Artaud, Morgan's associate's name).31 Its plan involved issuing bonds to sustain a short-term 
credit program that would serve to finance European imports. The US government was expected to 
subscribe 10% of these bonds, something to which it immediately objected. Furthermore, the French 
Treasury also reacted against it, partially because no agreement could be reached regarding how the 
resulting exchange-rate risk of the plan would be, nor about who would take responsibility.  
These first unsuccessful propositions did not hinder the emergence of other, related plans. As 
the economic situation deteriorated, a new initiative was advanced in the fall of 1919 through the 
president of the Dutch central bank, Gerard Vissering and the director of the Dutch bank Hope & Cie, 
Carel Eliza Ter Meulen, who convened two conferences of bankers in Amsterdam to discuss the 
situation. Eventually, the “group of Amsterdam” issued a Memorandum in which they listed the 
current economic problems and concluded by urging the eight countries to which they belonged to 
organize an international financial conference.32 This document was signed by more than 150 
prominent personalities from the financial, academic and diplomatic spheres, sent to all concerned 
governments and published in January 1920 in some of the most important newspapers, such as the 
London Times and the New York Times.  Consequently, in February, the League took charge of the 
rapid organization of an international conference, held in Brussels the 24th of September 1920.33 For 
two weeks, almost 150 experts from finance ministries, central banks and private banks of 39 States 
tried to find solutions to the world’s financial distresses.34 Of the four commissions established at this 
conference, one was especially devoted to the international credit question.  
The aim of this commission was to find solutions to cope with the lack of international credit, 
especially for Central and Eastern Europe. What the commission finally proposed was the creation 
within the League of an organ that would serve as guarantor for international credit borrowers whose 
access to the regular market was impossible because they came from countries that were financially 
                                                          
26
 Kindleberger, A Financial History. 
27
 Burk, “The Diplomacy of Finance”; Horn, “A Private Bank at War.” 
28
 Abrahams, “American Bankers,” 574–580; Artaud, La Question Des Dettes, 173–180. 
29
 Abrahams, “American Bankers,” 574. 
30
 Artaud, La Question Des Dettes, 173–174. 
31
 Ibid., 175. 
32
 League of Nations Archives (LONA), R293, 10/2845/2845. Also at the Bank of England Archives, BOEA, 
C40/1034. 
33
 Ter Meulen to Eric Drummond, 2nd March 1920. LONA, R293, 10/3253/2845. 
34
 Conférence financière internationale, comptes rendus de la Conférence, Tome 1, Rapport de la Conférence, 
Bruxelles, Th. Dewarichet, imprimé pour la Société des Nations, 1920, LONA  pp.  35-47. 
9 
 
unreliable. This organization was to be composed of bankers and businessmen that were to be selected 
and elected by the Council of the League.35 This project was known as the “Ter Meulen scheme,” in 
reference to the Dutch banker who designed it.36 It involved the participation of the League, private 
bankers and sovereign debtors. It was intended to support traders or manufacturers who wanted to 
obtain credits for import purposes. They had to apply to their government, which would then contact 
this new organ at the League. After having decided if the request was related to essential imports, the 
organ asked the borrowing State to present the guaranties it would provide to secure the credit 
requested.37 Guarantees had to be linked to real income, such as tariffs’ revenues. Both parties would 
then agree on how the guaranties would be managed, and the State was then allowed to issue bonds 
denominated in gold. The bonds were used as collaterals and were given to the exporter. If the 
transaction took place normally and the importer paid the exporter, the bonds could be canceled. If the 
importer failed to fulfill the terms of the contract, the exporter could sell the bonds. The Ter Meulen 
scheme thus associated the private as well as the public sector in the setting up of the loan. 
Eventually, this project altogether with other recommendations of the conference came to a 
call for the creation of a permanent body dedicated to economic and financial questions inside the 
League. Within a few weeks, this recommendation turned into concrete results as the first session of 
the Provisional Economic and Financial Commission (PEFC) of the League took place by November 
1920.38 From the very beginning, the question of the implementation of the Ter Meulen scheme was 
set in the agenda.39 Moreover, in March 1921 an “Organizer of international credits”, Sir Drummond 
Fraser, was appointed by the League in London.40 His role was to promote the Ter Meulen scheme 
among lending and borrowing countries. He advertised this new plan in countries that could benefit in 
Europe, mainly in the UK, as well as in the US, to try to foster the scheme.41 Nevertheless, Myers 
summarized the governments' general refusal “on the grounds either that it would involve outside 
interference in their domestic affairs, or that it would classify them as 'impoverished' nations”.42  
In its last report to the Financial Committee of the League in February 1922, Drummond 
Fraser concluded that no further development of the scheme seemed possible at the time.43 His official 
appointment terminated in March 1922 and he decided not to apply for a new term. A few months 
after the retirement of Drummond Fraser, the Organization of International Credit was transferred 
from London to Geneva.44 Ultimately, no real accomplishment came from the Organization and the 
Ter Meulen scheme was never put into practice. However, Myers accurately observed that the League 
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was regarded as the “proper authority to supervise international capital movements”.45 In fact, even if 
no plan allowing private enterprises to get credit with the backing of the League would be created, in 
the following years the League would be asked to help to set up and to manage several credits plans 
for Eastern and Central European countries. The main problem those countries encountered was a lack 
of confidence from potential lenders.46 From that perspective, the League appeared mainly to be an 
external support to gain credibility among creditors.  
 
Marketing the League loans 
The reconstruction efforts pursued by the League were shaped by the most urgent necessities and by 
constant diplomatic and strategic work that aimed to involve governments and private agents. To a 
large extent, the Austrian case served as a model for subsequent loans with reconstruction purposes - 
supported or not by the League. An ex-post analysis serves to identify the different phases of the 
procedure used. These phases were defined according to the precise conditions of the requesting 
country.47 The tasks and responsibilities were shared among the different organs of the League (the 
Council, the Financial Committee and the Secretariat). In short, the Council – which was with the 
Assembly the main authority of the League - was the arm that was primarily responsible for all work 
done in the League. It was the organ which governments were obliged to address when they sought 
financial assistance from the League.48 The Council would then dispatch the different tasks to different 
bodies, but it was the only organ that could make decisions and approve documents and reports. The 
Financial Committee would then be appointed by the Council to examine the requests and give its 
opinion, frequently with the support of the Secretariat’s Economic and Financial Section. In later 
stages, the Financial Committee would prepare reconstruction plans based on the preliminary reports 
on the economic and social needs of the country. Once an agreement was met between all parties, the 
resulting legal documents that represented the road map and the obligations to which the country 
would be bound had to be approved by the Council. Finally, the Council was also responsible for the 
appointment of trustees and all the League’s officials working on the financial schemes. During the 
whole process, it was also the organ that was in charge of settling major disputes.  
 The steps required to issue a League Loan can be summarized in four phases, which may 
overlap chronologically but are nonetheless illustrative of the manner though which the League loans 
were conceived. 1) A diagnostic phase, whose final outcome was a report published by the Council. It 
described the precise economic, financial and social conditions of the requesting country and 
identified the main needs to be addressed in the financial reconstruction scheme; 2) The general 
agreement phase, that concerned the preparation of all the necessary documents describing the road 
map for the reconstruction scheme (protocols, formal approval by the council and ratification by the 
public authorities of the country concerned). It also defined the terms, objectives and conditions to be 
met in applying for an external loan. 3) The Loan planning phase, which involved a joint effort to 
contact and obtain the support of creditor governments, central banks and underwriting banks of 
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different countries. The League also had to name the trustees and agree with the fiscal agents on the 
use of the proceeds; 4) Market placement.49 
 1) Diagnostic phase: Deepening the money doctor metaphor, the first phase of the issuing 
mechanism of League loans was the diagnosis of the patient. The League’s own narrative emphasizes 
that they would only intervene in countries willing to have it involved. This implied a number of 
informal contacts where a government would provide the League with the necessary information and 
proposals for the role of the League in a country's reconstruction plan. Once both parties agreed on 
some basic principles of cooperation, and when the Council received a formal request by the 
government, the League would begin an enquiry procedure. The Council of the League would then 
inform the Secretariat or the Financial Committee, who carried out the detailed work.50 They formed 
commissions and named the agents who would be responsible for investigations and deliver a report 
on the precise problems and solutions to a country's financial situation. The final outcome of this first 
phase was a document called the general report. 
Austria provides an illustrative example of the League’s procedure. It also shows how the League 
succeeded in weakening the initial resistance by creditor governments, underwriters and even 
borrowers. Austria was the first country that appealed for the League almost as soon as the EFO was 
settled up.51 Given the novelty and incertitude of the future of this initiative, Austria's government 
simultaneously looked for direct support from other governments and private banks. In March 1921, it 
informally received the backing of the League's council. The League's initial plan was to set up a relief 
credit plan and evoked the necessity of obtaining a long-term reconstruction loan. But the committee’s 
work turned out to be very difficult as the Austrian case brought out not only financial questions but 
also diplomatic ones, linked to the Peace Treaty and to the reparations settlement.52 Arthur Salter, the 
first Director of the EFO, remained optimistic however and wrote (somewhat altruistically) in his 
memoirs: 
“I well remember a Sunday picnic on the Lake of Geneva, a few days before the formal 
work began, when Monnet, Blackett and I discussed the question in both its financial and its 
political aspects, and concluded that the League could save Austria, and we will do our utmost 
to see that it does.”53 
Between May and June 1922, Austria received a first set of governmental bilateral short-term 
loans that helped it to cope with the most urgent problems.54 The League pursued a set of enquiries 
between 1921 and early 1922, and among a set of recommendations in terms of economic policies and 
institutional needs, they strongly recommended a long-term loan to provide a definitive solution to 
Austria's financial needs. 
 2) The General Agreement. The next step concerned the joint work necessary to define the 
strategy for the reconstruction plan. Delegations sent by the Financial Committee would gather 
information, establish the individual tasks to pursue and define the economic reforms. A 
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Commissioner General would be appointed to meet these aims and would be sent to the country to 
work and advise the governments on fiscal issues, and in some cases on the establishment of a central 
bank. Most of the loans had macroeconomic purposes—though two were more related to extraordinary 
expenses due to the massive entrance of political refugees, Greece and Bulgaria. The reconstruction 
plan undertaken was mainly focused on currency stabilization. It consisted of the adoption of 
economic policies to be pursued in order to meet all the necessary conditions for this aim: the 
existence of an independent central bank, the necessary amount of gold reserves, and a free exchange 
market. Healthy public finances were considered an important intermediate step, for which the 
reduction of deficits through reforms in the taxation system and the reduction of expenditures were 
generally introduced. A long-term loan was regarded as necessary for the transitory period before the 
budget could be balanced, as well as for allowing the central bank to obtain the necessary gold 
reserves to restore the gold standard monetary regime. The program was given a legal basis through 
one or several agreements approved by the Council and signed by the government, called the Geneva 
Protocols. 
 3) The Loan planning phase. Once the amount of the long-term loan and its precise purposes 
were defined, the central objective of the next step was to obtain the loan in the best terms possible. 
The main task that followed, therefore, was to gain the “confidence of issuing houses and the 
investment public”.55 In the last loans issues, this objective was legally embodied in a clause of the 
Protocols. Moreover, the League also strongly recommended dealing only with “first class” issuing 
houses, and also reserved for itself the power to approve the loan terms: the method of issue, the issue 
price, the rate of interest, the amortization and the expenses of the issue.56 The League had justified 
this given the experience of the first loans (see next section). The League further included the 
necessity to float each loan on several markets (to avoid having exclusive national interests emerge). 
The need to turn only to  first-class issuing houses (even if inferior houses may have offered better 
terms) was justified because the League recognized that it could not alone maintain the credit of the 
borrowing country on the market. In general, the League concluded, the terms obtained by the 
borrowing country should not be the result of its weaker position against issuing bankers or 
bondholders, and contracts had to conform with the Protocols.  
In 1930 the League considered it had succeeded in achieving this initial goal, as the 
association of the League to new loan issues was a most important factor in obtaining more favorable 
terms for Governments than they would otherwise have obtained.57 This was achieved by successfully 
implementing the stabilization programs, something regarded as a condition sine qua non for the 
survival of the programs itself. The Council and the Financial Committee regarded themselves as 
accountable for the adequate implementation of the economic program – to the Leagues’ Assembly, to 
the borrowing Government and to investors. The building of confidence was equally related to other 
items such as the provision of a delegated monitor through the appointment of a Commissioner. Its 
tasks included the final assignation and authorization for the utilization of the proceeds from the loans, 
which had to adhere to the same terms as agreed to in the Protocols. The Protocol could also include 
the provision of an advisor to the central bank, and the appointment of a trustee for the payment of the 
debt service. The existence of a trustee and/or a fiscal agent was consistent with the common practice 
of the time. Fiscal agents were in charge of making interest payments—it would most frequently be 
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the underwriters themselves who pursued this task. Trustees were mostly appointed by the Council, 
and represented the interests of the bondholders. They were in charge of monitoring and managing the 
funds necessary for debt service, and to act in case of default (for instance, the seizure of the 
guarantees or the use and administration of reserve funds).  
4) Market placement. This final step was almost solely the responsibility of underwriters and 
borrowing governments, although the League increasingly participated in securing a successful 
placement among intermediaries. This phase involved the elaboration of the prospectuses (for each 
market) and the general bond, which provided a summary for investors of the engagements adopted by 
the borrowers towards the loan. The League also specified the bond issues' dates and timings. It then 
concentrated all the information generated in the financial centers where the loans were issued, and 
communicated the results of the placements to all parties. The banks responsible for each tranche 
would send a telegraph with the results, the amount of bonds subscribed and the first price quotations.  
 
Gaining credibility: facts and figures from the League loans 
The League actively participated in the issues of a total of nine loans on behalf of six countries 
between 1923 and 1928.58 As we mentioned above, most of these loans had reconstruction and 
currency stabilization purposes, though in the case of the first Greece and Bulgaria loans other aims 
were evoked. Each loan was issued in tranches, each of which corresponded to a distinct national 
financial market, denominated in the respective currency but coupled with the same pledges and 
guarantees.59  No fixed exchange rate clauses were included in the first issues, though they became 
common once the gold standard was reestablished in the countries where these loans were issued. 
However, the last loans were only issued in dollars and sterling pounds (though the tranches continued 
to be issued in different financial markets), thereby diminishing the potential currency risk stemming 
from fluctuations between the currencies in which the bonds were issued.  
The first of these loans was the Austrian 6% loan of 1923, which, as we already mentioned, 
had a special guarantee from several countries in Europe.60 Subsequent loans did not enjoy any 
explicit guarantees from third states nor from the League itself, though the arrangements of the loans 
did foresee to provide the most reliable guarantees through the pledge of specific taxes and revenues 
that were to be managed by the trustees. The bonds were mostly issued through public offerings. 
These offerings took place in different locations often at the same time, though the timing would 
sometimes differ for marketing purposes. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of these loans. 
Besides Austria and Hungary, Greece, Danzig, Bulgaria and Estonia benefited from the League's 
support. 
<Table 1 around here> 
For this paper’s purposes, we can identify three main activities through which the League 
facilitated market access. First, it resolved the credibility of an economic program by assuming 
responsibility and undertaking the planning of a project until its final achievement. Second, the League 
supported borrowing governments and pursued diplomatic work to remove any obstacle that may have 
impeded the rapid and favorable issue of the bonds. This was important for countries that were in 
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default and that still had open negotiations with banks or bondholders of previous loans. And third, the 
League provided the monitoring functions for the stabilization projects and for the use of the loan 
proceeds through the nomination of trustees, permanent agents and, in some cases, advisers to newly 
created central banks. Some figures, counterfactual comparisons and illustrative examples sustain our 
contentions. In this section we describe and show that credibility was gained through a difficult (and 
expensive) process. We then evaluate the League's work through direct comparisons with other loans 
in subsequent sections. 
The League dealt with some of the most risky issuers and faced therefore a major challenge in 
attempting to gain the confidence and support of governments and financial markets. As we 
mentioned, the first issue on behalf of Austria could only be arranged through the special guarantee 
obtained by the League. Despite this and despite the League's support, confidence was not established 
automatically. In the early 1920s, governments in creditor countries were rather reluctant towards 
foreign lending, and some of the most important financial intermediaries in London and New York 
would only agree to underwrite a loan once an agreement by their governments or the central bank was 
obtained. This is, at least, how the first loan on behalf of an Eastern-European country 
(Czechoslovakia) was issued in London in 1922.61 Chandler argued that Morgan would “never float a 
loan that Strong disapproved,” though he recognized that “less conservative investment banks” were 
less influenced by the Federal Reserve opinion. 62 However, given the general environment of hostility 
toward foreign lending in the major financial markets, confidence had to be painfully earned.63  
The League's first task was therefore to obtain, almost simultaneously, the support of central 
banks and financial intermediaries. Austria's government first approached J.P. Morgan in February 
1920 through its Paris branch, Morgan Harjes & Co.64 That bank became a key actor in issuing the 
Austria loan.65 For a period of three years, the bank had frequent contact with Vienna’s 
representatives, League's experts, French and American governments' officials and the British banks 
Rothschilds, Barings and Schroders.66 During this entire period, even if Morgan's partners showed 
strong reluctance to engage in a large loan for Austria, they maintained close relations with the EFO. 
The main concern that appeared to impede them to act as underwriters was their perception of the 
difficulty to place such a loan in US financial markets. Nevertheless, they finally agreed to underwrite 
the American tranche of the League loan in May 1923.67 According to Beyersdorf, it was a 
“competitive offer by Gordon Leith, the European representative of the US bank Speyer & Co [that 
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seemed to] have put an end to J.P. Morgan’s hesitations”. 68 This may have been part of the 
explanation, though this was unlikely given the strong preference shown by the League and central 
bankers to have Morgan as the main underwriter. Our own research does acknowledge however that 
the bank's will to keep the lead in this first postwar, important European loan contributed to Morgan's 
final positive decision to participate.69  
These factors were certainly not the only ones. Further evidence demonstrates that Morgan 
regarded the Austrian loan as strongly risky. The bank therefore sought the support of governments 
and central banks, for which the League also strongly advocated. The Bank of England could be 
directly implicated, as a loan promoter among governments and as underwriter of the British tranche. 
Piétri links this involvement to the role of the Anglo Austrian Bank Ltd., largely controlled by the 
Bank of England, in a first short-term British loan of 1922. 70 Further archival evidence suggests that in 
February 1922, the British governor considered the restoration of Austria, in the short and the long-
run, as a necessity in which central bankers had to participate.71 He therefore reaffirmed and extended 
this view to the whole ex-Austrian Empire in April 1923, saying that: “If we can thus set up Austria, 
we must tackle Hungary next, so as to establish one by one the new parts of old Austria”.72 Salter 
equally argued that: “The Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, became interested in 
the plan, and there was no other man who could so effectively take the lead in the difficult loan 
negotiations which were essential to success”.73 
An additional element to which the League strongly contributed was precisely the securing of 
the direct guarantees from governments across Europe. We regard this as the decisive contribution by 
the League to assure the necessary support of Morgan and other underwriters in Europe. In fact, the 
governor of the Bank of England attached a great deal of importance to the role of JP Morgan.74 In 
short, the setting up of the Austrian loan probably benefited from several “good fortune[s]”— to use 
Arthur Salter's words — for which the League was probably most responsible. 75 First of all, the 
creation of the EFO settled an international institutional framework to accommodate and manage the 
Austrian request. Second, the League also played a role of guarantor for the country among potential 
lenders. Third, its joint action with the Bank of England, J.P. Morgan, and its European branches, 
succeeded in making the project concretely feasible.76 Ultimately, the overall action of some the 
League's members can be considered as having been a crucial element for obtaining this general 
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support. In fact, we may even speculate that without the permanent communication and lobbying 
efforts they made among the different actors involved, the Austrian loan would not have been feasible.   
But breaking the ice required some additional costs that Austria's government was obliged to 
assume. Figure 1 shows the underwriting fees that the country had to pay to underwriters in each 
financial center where the loan was issued. Underwriting fees and the particular terms of the issue of 
each tranche of the bonds were negotiated individually with underwriters. The variation is therefore 
significant and their values were not necessarily correlated with the amount underwritten.77  JP 
Morgan issued for instance only a 16% share of the amount, and yet charged the highest fee (4.96). 78 
Austria certainly accepted this amount due to the signaling effect of having the loan issued in NY and 
because JP Morgan offered a positive reputational effect.79  For comparative purposes, JP Morgan 
issued in the same year a loan on behalf of the Swiss government and charged a fee which was more 
than 2% lower [2.37].80 In other words, despite Austria's own guarantees, governmental guarantees 
and despite the League's own support, considerable skepticism remained; the banks priced this 
accordingly.  
<Figure 1 around here> 
A second strategy to minimize the risk assumed by the banks included the decision to set an 
attractive price of issue. The banks insisted on this condition because they were required to make a 
firm commitment on the bonds. In other words, it was requested that the banks assume the risk of a 
placement failure, as they had to buy the bonds themselves and assume responsibility for their 
successful sale to the final investors. This was part of the general strategy employed by the League in 
order to assure the proceeds from the loans. The price at issue for the London tranche, for instance, 
was therefore set at a considerable low level (80%), representing a yield to maturity of 7.5%, while the 
UK consol was offering a yield of 4.26%. This was a considerable spread despite the UK government's 
own guarantee. 
Austria's bonds were therefore considerably underpriced. To the extent that underpricing can 
be related to information asymmetries, by which investors request a premium for their risk taking, this 
element was an indicator of the challenges that the League faced with the first issues.81 We have 
represented this general behavior in Figure 2. With the exception of the American tranche (whose 
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price had slightly fallen) and the French tranche,—whose behavior was more related to the particularly 
unfavorable situation of France's Stock markets and the French franc—the first quotations of the bonds 
were considerably higher than the issue price.82 In the most extreme case, bond prices of the Swedish 
tranche increased from 78 to 102, which translated into a 30% gain for an initial investor. In December 
1924, a year after the issue took place, this trend was mostly confirmed and prices stabilized at levels 
considerably higher than the prices at issue. Even the price of the American tranche increased by 
7.5%.83 
The next country the League financial committee had to deal with was Hungary. In August 
1923, once the reparations commission had agreed on the amounts to be paid by Hungary, the 
government applied for the support of the League. To the extent to which Austria's loan was 
considered a success, and given the fact that Hungary was not in the same desperate position as 
Austria, obtaining financial support for the stabilization plan was at first considered a more accessible 
task. Again, the League applied for Morgan to underwrite the American tranche of the loan in 1924. 
However, the bank refused, evoking the fact that the American market was not really favourable for 
the launching of a new loan. Thomas Lamont added that he was aware that the League had been 
“approached by some other American banking group, and it may be with such group that [the loan] 
will have success”.84 This time, however, and contrary to Austria's loan, the EFO commission was 
already in contact with the American bank Speyer & Co. The commission decided not to insist that 
Morgan issue the loan. After the 24th of June refusal by Lamont, negotiations continued with Speyer & 
Co and on the 30th of June the contract was signed. A point of contention arose with Speyer’s initial 
attempts to tie their participation to a clause that gave “them [an] exclusive right to do other Hungarian 
business [in] New York” for the duration of the currency loan. The EFO refused but convinced Speyer 
& Co. to accept the contract without the clause.85 
The apparent self-confidence of the League during the setting up of the Hungarian loan is 
noteworthy. They went further without the support of J.P. Morgan and firmly rejected the inclusion of 
a clause requested by Speyer. Moreover, and perhaps more important, Hungary's loan had been 
possible to launch without any third party government's support, showing that the League had gained 
credibility among investors. Arthur Salter summarized this, arguing that: “With the prestige the 
League had gained in Austria it was possible to issue the Hungarian reconstruction loan without 
governmental guarantees, and Hungary's recovery was even more rapid”.86 
<Figure 2 around here> 
Obviously, Speyer's offer was no free lunch. Hungary's government had to pay a 9.3% 
underwriting fee. Besides, the loan offered an 8% interest rate and a price at issue of 87.5% for the 
American tranche —representing a yield to maturity of 8.6% at a moment when the US Treasury long-
term bonds were offering a yield of 3.9%—. The Commissioner-General of the League loan to 
Hungary regretted “to see an issue made in the United States, on terms which must necessarily create 
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the impression that the bonds are a speculative investment”.87 Figure 3 plainly shows the market's 
pricing of an early League loan in the absence of a guarantee by third governments. Besides Speyer’s 
high underwriting fee, its average value for the rest of tranches (other than the tranche reserved for the 
domestic market) reached more than 5%. At the end, however, and despite these bankers' apparent 
fears, the issue was a success.88 The first quotations in New York offered investors a 2% gain, and for 
those keeping their bonds one year after their initial investment could obtain a reward of almost 5% 
increase (in London this figure doubled to almost 12%). Hungary's loan, though expensive, allowed 
the country to acquire the necessary funds to proceed to its stabilization program.  
<Figure 3 around here> 
Nevertheless, once the dues were paid, subsequent League loans benefited from more 
favorable terms. Admittedly, market conditions improved in most financial places, but tangible results 
and general approval in the press and in contemporary publications certainly contributed to the 
League's reputation.89 Austria had succeeded in stabilizing its currency and budgets. Hungary was on 
the same path and the League's commissioner in that country released frequent reports on the League's 
program achievements. The conditions with which the League operated were clear and in broad terms, 
the rules of the game were openly defined. The continuously improving perception of the League can 
also be seen in the effects on the government bonds' markets of the news of its intervention. In figure 4 
we show how the Austrian gold rentes reacted to the announcement of the League's participation and 
to the final signature of the Geneva Protocols.90 The continuous, albeit slow, increase observed before 
the announcement of the final Protocols was likely related to incertitude and apathy regarding the 
conditions that the government would have to meet in order to obtain the League's support. An 
illustration of this general mood can be found in Austria's Neue Freie Presse's recommendation to its 
readers to “get rid of any susceptibilities (and to) see the good will behind the humiliating conditions 
of the League, and to allow themselves to be helped…”91 
<Figure 4 around here> 
 Nevertheless, and despite the hardness of the League’s conditionality, the reactions of 
governments bonds’ prices to the announcements of the League’s intervention were thereafter 
consistently positive. In figures 5-7, the prices of Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece bonds are shown 
around two dates (request for a League’s program, and signature of the Protocols). Hungary’s gold and 
paper rentes reacted positively though differently to the initial announcement and the signature of the 
first protocol. Overall, there was a general increase in both cases; Bulgaria’s bond prices also 
experienced an increase, even before the country made an arrangement with the bondholders of the 
defaulted pre-war bonds (10 September 1926). The League accelerated the negotiations with the 
countries participating in the reparation commission, and conditioned its support to a rapid agreement 
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with bondholders and underwriters of the pre-war defaulted bonds.92 Finally, the prices of the Greek's 
4% monopoly loan increased more than 61% from the prices before the announcement of the League's 
intervention. 
<Figure 5 around here> 
<Figure 6 around here> 
<Figure 7 around here> 
 It would be therefore safe to assert that despite the difficulties of the first two loans to attract 
investors and underwriters, the League could finally add the support of its name to the loans it 
promoted. A final and anecdotic example is the importance of its name on the prospectuses. The 
prominent role of this new brand was not overlooked by those designing these important documents. 
Whereas Austria’s and Hungary's and the first Greek loan's prospectuses would only mention the 
League’s resolutions and Protocols in passage, all other loans showed the League’s support just below 
the main name of the loan. The phrase: “An international loan issued under the auspices of the League 
of Nations” became a common trademark in all subsequent advertising documents of the bonds. 
Speyer confirmed before the US Senate Commission in 1932 that “the League of Nations' moral 
endorsement of course had a great deal of weight with many people”.93 When a Senator asked why the 
bank would nonetheless buy Hungary's bonds at a price as low as 80 (equivalent to a high 
underwriting fee), Speyer simply replied that he would not think that the loan could have been sold “at 
any price without the endorsement of the League of Nations”.94  
 The decreasing evolution of fees in the main financial markets where the League loans were 
issued can also be appreciated in Table 1. A useful benchmark to evaluate this performance are the 
differences between the League loan underwriting fees compared with the lowest fees that 
underwriters charged in the New York market every year. These "fees' spreads" can be also interpreted 
as a measure of placement failure risk.  In 1924, they were 6.45 and 5.45 for Hungary's and Greece's 
loans respectively. The last League loan for Bulgaria in 1928 had a lower fee's spread (3.58), though 
the lowest fee's spread was precisely the one charged for Bulgaria's previous loan of 1926 (1.35), not 
coincidentally.  This was a direct consequence of the League's increased participation in the 
negotiations of the loans’ terms with the banks. Since the Bulgaria loan of 1926, the League added a 
clause in the Protocols in which it requested its approval of the loan's terms (among which were issue 
price, rates of interest, and all the expenses of the issue; see Tyler).95 In the case of Estonia’s loan of 
1927, for instance, the negotiations with the banks were directly carried out by the EFO Chairman, Dr. 
Vilem Pospisil.96 The League's work therefore was not limited to assuring market access. It 
increasingly did so while minimizing borrowing costs, partly through its direct involvement in 
negotiations with underwriting banks.  
                                                          
92
 From the LON Archives, we know that some underwriters that still held Bulgaria's pre-war bonds approached 
the League to be sure that Bulgaria would meet its engagements before the issue of the new loan. So for instance, 
Disconto-Gesellschaft argued that it still held bonds from a 1914 loan and listed those tax revenues (such as the 
customs duties) that Bulgaria's government had committed as guarantee and that the League foresaw to engage 
for the new loan (Box R 434, File 10/52854/46369; see also the general strategy for the League's negotiations 
with the reparation commission and the bondholders in File 10/52422/46369). 
93
 United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance, Sale of Foreign Bonds, 617. 
94
 Ibid., 618. 
95
 Tyler, The League of Nations, 54. 
96
 LONA, Box R 423, File 10/59713/38855. 
20 
 
 A final measure of this general improvement in the terms under which the League loans were 
issued is the comparison of the prices of issue and the first prices quoted on the market. Their 
differences almost evaporated or were minimal (less than 2% absolute change).97 After Hungary's loan 
of 1924, none of the League loans experienced a significant change in their bond prices. In other 
words, unlike the first loans for Austria and Hungary, the bonds were not underpriced. Still, all of 
them were successfully placed. For instance, London's newspaper Outlook published after the first 
Bulgarian loan issue that as a result of the loan being oversubscribed, those having asked for large 
amounts were allotted only about 4%, though opening prices in the London Stock Exchange were 
quoting at only about a ½% premium.98 The article comforted disappointed investors by announcing 
Estonia's “similar” incoming loan, though the newspaper was unable to specify the times and terms of 
the new issue.  
 
Market access with and without the League 
Countries asking for the support for the league did so because they had hardly any other option if they 
wanted to access capital markets. Other countries, however, did have an open choice. The reasons 
advanced in the literature for why they refused to have the League involved were diverse, but were 
mainly related to the fact that they did not want to have the same treatment as the defeated countries of 
the war. Meyer suggests that the fact that the first League loans programs were developed on behalf of 
Austria and Hungary, two defeated nations in WWI, provoked some reluctance in other ex-Allied 
countries to turn to the EFO. But probably more importantly, according to Meyer, was the 
unattractiveness of having a stringent control over the use of the proceeds of the loan and over the 
revenues forming the principal security of the loan. 99  
We have looked at the conditions of other stabilization programs in Eastern Europe and find 
that they were similar to those imposed on the countries that had the support of the League, including 
foreign control of the loan's proceeds, a permanent foreign commissioner and conditions regarding 
public finances and monetary reform. Moreover, the markets treated these countries to similar or 
worse terms to those of the League loans. In order to further test our "market access under improved 
conditions hypothesis", direct comparisons can be done for specific cases—chosen based on common 
initial conditions and whether there was a comparable alternative scenario, which was bilateral support 
instead of the multilateral approach as implied by the League's methods. We also provide the 
counterfactual cases where no alternative options existed, but countries decided nonetheless to refuse 
the League's conditions. 
a) First-time issuers. A first and straightforward comparison can be pursued for first-time 
borrowers in international financial markets. Poland and Estonia provide a perfect and straightforward 
case.100 Both countries were created after the war. They both faced political instability and high 
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monetary and financial distress. Poland had to achieve monetary unification and, later, monetary 
stabilization. The government first applied for a foreign loan with JP Morgan in 1924, but the bank 
refused, evocating budget instability. The country obtained a small loan through the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, though it was apparently insufficient for the country' needs.101 
Poland could, however, stabilize its currency and establish a new central bank. It later 
contracted a foreign loan in the US in 1925, with Dillon, Read and Co. as underwriters, though the 
issue apparently failed.102 A fall in exports due to a customs war with Germany put additional pressure 
on the zluty, and could only temporarily temper its depreciation thanks to a direct credit by the Federal 
reserve. The Polish government sought to avoid the League of Nations because the “control of 
Poland's finances by means of the League of Nations was undesirable for Poland”.103 Under the 
recommendation of Dillon Read, the Polish government requested the advice of a mission headed by 
Edwin W. Kemmerer. But the adoption of a stabilization plan and the issue of a new foreign loan were 
delayed until October 1927, once the complicated interaction moving between rivalry and cooperation 
among the main central banks – the Federal reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of France- was 
solved. The central banks (under the head of the Federal reserve) conditioned their support and direct 
credit on a set of requests. The macroeconomic conditions and the necessity to appoint a foreign 
advisor to the central bank were similar to the conditions generally requested by the League.  
b) Previous defaulters. A second comparison concerns countries that defaulted on previous 
debts. Romania was in financial distress as a consequence of WWI and continued political tensions 
both inside the country and with its neighbors. Though the political regime established in 1922 was 
hostile to foreign capital, in 1926 the new regime led by Alexandru Averescu actively sought the 
foreign resources that were necessary for the stabilization of the leu and the development of the 
country.104 The government explored different possibilities, including the League of Nations, though 
this was rapidly rejected due to their unwillingness to adopt the conditions that the League would 
certainly request, including the installation of a foreign adviser at the National Bank.105 Other 
negotiations included British banks (mainly Schröder) and German Banks (mainly Disconto 
Gesellschaft) though they all failed given the dispute over some unpaid pre-war bonds issued by 
Romania's government and held by German investors.106 The final solution was finally reached in the 
summer of 1928, when an arrangement with bondholders was met and a consortium of central banks, 
led by the Bank of France accorded a direct credit to Romania's central banks. The Bank of France 
also arranged a stabilization program with similar conditions to the League loans.107 The loan was 
finally issued in February 1929, almost three years after the initial negotiations.  
Romania's loan was issued some months before the crash of the New York Stock market. 
Market conditions were therefore more adverse than in the previous years, and the spread at issue was 
4.55%, which was higher than all the League loans (other than Hungary's 1924 loan, see Table 1). The 
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prices of the bonds remained stable (albeit at the initial low level) for some months and strongly fell 
thereafter.108 While New York banks charged relatively reasonable fees, underwriting fees in Paris and 
London were far higher (6.5 and 7.69, respectively).109 In Table 2 we have represented the conditions 
for loans to Eastern European countries that were issued for the first time, and those with 
reconstruction purposes.  
The first loan in Table 2 was issued on behalf of Czechoslovakia's government in 1922. As we 
mentioned, the macroeconomic conditions of the country were far better than in the rest of the region 
and yet, as a new borrower, investors charged a high risk premium and underwriting banks'  requested 
high underwriting fees. This country did however improve its borrowing terms in further loans in 1924 
and 1925 (not shown in the table). Poland, also a first time issuer, issued a first loan in 1925 and a 
second in 1927. Both loans had high spreads and underwriting fees. These terms were considerably 
worse than all the League loans, particularly when compared to the League's first-time issuers (Danzig 
and Estonia). In fact, The Economist commented on the second Polish loan, saying that it was 
“different from most preceding stabilization loans in that it has been issued after, and not before, 
budgetary equilibrium has been attained and at a time when the zloty has been substantially stabilized 
for over a year. In these circumstances the terms may seem somewhat severe…” It concluded that it 
was probable that “better terms could have been attained if the scheme had been organized through the 
Finance committee of the League of Nations".110 This seems in fact to be the case for the rest of the 
loans in Table 2. 
c) Historical counterfactuals. A final test about the importance of the League in facilitating 
market access is the historical counterfactual of countries that for different reasons would not benefit 
from the League's support and therefore remained unable to tap for financial resources in international 
capital markets. Though the League dealt with a number of countries that asked for advice and 
support, only some of them had specifically asked for the support of a foreign loan since they first 
approached the League. Once a foreign loan was planned, the conditions set by the League had to be 
met. This was not a minor item, as the League did not really enter into bargaining with the 
governments it supported. Some would accept —and access capital markets— while others would 
refuse and remain excluded. Estonia for instance tried to negotiate the imposition of a foreign advisor 
for its central bank. As the first enquiry report of the EFO was elaborated —a document which would 
become the basis for the reconstruction plan afterwards—, a disagreement arose about the section 
related to the transformation of the central bank. While Estonia's government advocated keeping a 
foreign advisor as optional and subject to a proper decision, the League firmly opposed and considered 
the condition obligatory.111 The final text of the EFO's recommendations did foresee to provide more 
independence to Estonia's central bank and recognized that its transformation would need the “services 
of [foreign] experts acquainted with central banking,” on the same principles as those adopted for 
Austria, Hungary and Danzig.  
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Among the countries that refused the League's conditions —and were excluded from financial 
markets— were Albania, Armenia and Portugal.112 Albania is a case where the League rapidly 
recognized the political and economic need for its support. The country made a formal request on the 
25th March 1922, and after the report elaborated by the commission of enquiry, the EFO designed a 
plan for the reorganization of the public administration and the creation of a new central bank.113 The 
League also appointed a permanent advisor to Albania's government. However, the collaboration did 
not last due to the Albanian government’s perception that the reforms were not obtaining the expected 
results. It terminated the contract with its advisor before the conditions were established for the issue 
of a foreign loan. With the flow of political refugees into the country, the government returned to ask 
for the Leagues' support for a foreign loan that would allow the country to finance an office in charge 
of arranging the establishment of these refugees. Besides punctual and humanitarian support from the 
League, no further assistance was foreseen.114 Albania was thereafter unable to issue a long-term loan 
in the 1920s.  
 Portugal is also an interesting case. After the military coup in May 1926, the return to the gold 
standard became a priority for the government.115 Thus, the fiscal budget had to be balanced and the 
ongoing institutional reforms of the central bank had to be consolidated. The government tried to 
directly negotiate a loan with Barings in London in early 1928, though the bank ultimately refused 
because of, among other reasons, “the doubtful constitutional standing of the government”.116 
Probably expecting this negative outcome, the government had already made a formal request to the 
League to obtain its support for the issue of a foreign loan in November 1927. The Times summarized 
the general feeling at the EFO:  
“It may be noted that in some quarters doubts are entertained as to the advisability of extending 
too readily the facilities of the League to States in financial difficulties. It is pointed out that 
application to the League enables a State to get better terms than it could on its own merits, and 
that puts the states which stand on their own financial merits at a disadvantage in the credit 
market. The League may legitimately help a country that is palpably on the verge of ruin and if 
it be almost a case of propping up a tottering Government”117    
Even if the EFO's final decision was to accept the request, negotiations failed given the 
Portuguese government's refusal to accept a permanent agent (named “trustees agent”) appointed by 
the League. The main tasks of the permanent agent would have been to inform the body about the 
evolution of the economic situation, to liberate the necessary resources for each item outlined by the 
protocol to be signed and to receive the revenues assigned for the service of the loan. This was in fact 
the only disagreement after a couple of months of discussions and the report of the League's delegation 
in Lisbon (Cosoiu, 1934). Both sides had already agreed upon the necessary measures to follow for the 
stabilization plan: a fiscal reform, the use of the loan's proceeds (consolidation of the floating debt and 
funding of a country's program for infrastructure improvements). Other measures remained open –
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though no major dispute was foreseen-, such as the modifications to be introduced to the central bank 
status and the reorganization of the colonial banks' system.118   Portugal was unable to obtain a foreign 
loan thereafter, though it continued its plan to stabilize its currency and balance its budget with Salazar 
as Minister of Finance.  
 
Monitoring and its limitations: contagion, external shocks and volatility 
A final and important task pursued by the League was the monitoring of the economic 
situation of the countries where it intervened. This was done through the continuous publication of 
reports and other documents which were related to the League agent's direct activities. It also 
maintained control of the loan proceeds through the trustees it appointed. The results of the enquiries 
and the suggestions provided by the League's agents were sent and distributed to interested 
governments, central banks, the press and banks. Moreover, the appointment of a Commissioner-
General was an important decision which was mainly based on the candidates' connections with the 
most important investment banks. In the case of Hungary's loan, for instance, Salter forecasted that in 
the future, the role of the Commissioner-General would be critical to obtaining favorable borrowing 
terms. This would be pursued precisely through its monitoring functions: a situation in the country 
would be certified by this agent in whom “American issuing houses have confidence” in order to “be a 
favorable factor in negotiating with America”.119   
This information gathering was intensive and detailed. In the case of Austria, for instance, the 
Commissioner-General published monthly reports on every aspect of the country's economy, among 
which were public finances, the monetary situation, unemployment, trade, industry, agriculture, 
exchange rates and banks. It also reported on the use of the funds stemming from the loans, and 
complimented the work of the trustee who also reported on the revenues it had obtained and on the 
funds being used to service the debt.  This structure was also the case for Hungary, Danzig, Estonia 
and Bulgaria. In Greece, the use of the proceeds was supervised by the International Financial 
Commission that had been set up since 1898 after the Greco-Turkish war. In the cases where a 
permanent advisor to the central bank was also appointed, similar reports were released.120 Overall 
therefore, the League possessed the most relevant information on the performance of their stabilization 
programs, and kept control over the use of the loan proceeds and the revenues used to service the 
resulting debt.  
This permanent supervision certainly contributed to the League's stabilization programs’ 
credibility, which in turn facilitated the loans' placements.121 We maintain however, that these 
monitoring functions were mainly pursued to facilitate market access and not to provide the functions 
of modern rating agencies. In fact, all the devices set up by the League had an expiry date, agreed 
since the planning of the loan. The Protocols for each loan included a clause that determined when the 
Commissioner-General was expected to leave. The date agreed was dependent on the economy's 
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performance, and was fixed when the stabilization phase was over and not when the loan was fully 
repaid. The Council decided when the work could be considered finished and when the Leagues’ 
immediate responsibility for it and association with it terminated.122 
In the long-term, therefore, the supervision of the use of the loan proceeds did not rely on the 
League. It was a task for which the trustees held entire responsibility. In the cases of Austria and 
Hungary, both Commissioners left on the 26th June 1926. However, in none of them did bond prices 
react to the monitoring cessation. This shows that the League, contrary to the primary market, did not 
add value by itself in the secondary market: it did so through the macroeconomic performance of the 
countries where it intervened, as demonstrated by the continuous fall in spreads (see Figure 8). This 
situation also had a reverse side. When an adverse shock hit any of these countries, the spreads reacted 
as in any other case. This was the case of the Credit Anstalt crisis in May 1931. When the 
Commissioner General returned to Austria in September, there was little to be made. Conceptually, the 
power of this agent to influence a country's economic policy was through the conditioned provision of 
the loan's proceeds. Once the funds were used, the Commissioner had only a limited marge of 
maneuver, which was further diminished once the perspective of new loans decreased due to 
deteriorated conditions in international capital markets. This fact also explained why the return of 
Austria's General Commissioner did not have an impact on Austria's bonds prices. In the case of 
Hungary, the Commissioner-General regretted that public expenditure had more than doubled since he 
left (League of Nations, 1945:63). Monitoring did therefore influence spreads, but it did so through the 
positive impact of the League's programs on the macroeconomic position of the country. On the other 
hand, the League programs were successful and a priori credible due to the monitoring itself.  
A more systematic and broad consequence of this structure can be analyzed if we compare the 
bond prices behavior of the League loans with other countries in the region. As we have shown in the 
last section, the League provided a signaling effect whereby the announcement of a regime switch 
would be effectively realized. It was therefore unsurprising that prices raised once a country made the 
formal request to the League and when the formal conditions of the plan were established in the 
protocol. In the long term, however, this signaling effect could either have had a medium-term 
duration or just vanish if anticipations were not realized, just as for any other borrower. Take for 
instance a state whereby a country deviated from the behavior initially agreed (an increase in the 
monetary issue or an unexpected public deficit). If the League's signaling effect prevailed, prices 
would not react because investors would expect the League to correct the situation. This would have 
implied that the League had the means to do this —which it did not once the proceeds of the loan were 
utilized—.123 Therefore, we expect bond prices of League countries to consequently react to any new 
state of the economy just as other governments' bonds would do. This would also be the case for 
external shocks, with countries under the League auspices being perceived as having the same 
probability to adjust and return to the initial situation as any other country in similar economic 
conditions.  
A straightforward mean to test this signaling effect is the following. Given the fact that the 
League acted under the same principles and methods in every country, it would be natural to ask 
whether there was a common element in the behavior of the bond prices issued by the governments it 
supported, or if they were less volatile than the bond prices from other, Eastern European countries. 
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We have looked at long-term bond prices quoted in the New York Stock Exchange and compared 
them with other benchmark prices from countries in that region.124  
As a first measure we have computed correlation coefficients between bond spreads for 
countries from Eastern Europe quoting in the New York Stock Exchange market. They are shown in 
Table 3. We do not appreciate any difference in their values between countries with the participation 
of the League than without—rather the opposite. Estonia (a League loan country) has a correlation 
coefficient as low as 0.21 with Bulgaria (another League loan country), but as high as 0.8 with Poland 
(a non-League country). Serbia, on the contrary, shares a high correlation coefficient with League loan 
countries such as Bulgaria or Hungary (0.83). In fact, average correlation coefficients for each country 
with the sub-groups League vs Non-League bonds (shown at the bottom of the table) confirm that 
there are no major differences between them. 
We used a second method to confirm these results through principal component analysis.  This 
technique allows us to group the most relevant information by computing eigenvectors from the data 
variance-covariance matrix. The analysis has been conducted in three stages. First, we have included 
the bonds from all the countries in our sample. Results are reported in Table 4. The first principal 
component explains 73% of the variation of the sample, whereas the second explains 15% (a total of 
88%). The factor loadings in Table 4 can be interpreted as the correlations between individual spreads 
and the principal components. Their behavior is positive and uniform, which means that all countries 
moved together with the first principal component. The correlations with the second principal 
component change signs in all but Poland (a non-League country) and Estonia (a League country). 
Therefore no pattern seems to emerge. 
 Next, we divide or sample between League and non-League countries (Tables 5 and 6). For 
the League countries, the first principal component explains 74% of the common variation, and the 
second one tops off at 90% (a similar result as that of the total sample). We can appreciate that all the 
factor loadings also have positive correlations with the first principal component, but they become 
heterogeneous with the second principal component. Finally, Table 6 confirms that the results are 
similar for the non-League loans. The regional and individual patterns of the spreads' behavior are 
therefore uncorrelated to the presence of the League. 
  
Conclusions 
The League of Nations allowed for capital market access. Despite the adverse and difficult conditions 
under which the first loans were issued, the League acquired an improved position to influence 
borrowing costs through the successful implementation of the first stabilization plans —as perceived 
by the markets— and EFO’s activities in terms of monitoring and funds control. The League also used 
its rising reputation to gain credibility on the enforcement of the conditions it requested of the 
countries where it intervened, and this assured the continuity of the League’s stabilization programs. 
In a sense, it was a short-term commitment. Once the objectives were attained, the commissioner 
would leave and the country would then have the open choice to determine its economic policy, for 
which the League held no responsibility. We maintain therefore that previous works concentrating on 
the performance of the loans in the secondary markets missed the League's main contribution, which 
was to attract capital for the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. The novelty of this paper is 
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precisely its focus on the primary market conditions of the loans, which was the main objective of the 
League's work. It is equally worth noting that this mechanism relied only on private capital. In other 
words, in the success of its main aim —market access— also laid its main weakness.  On the one 
hand, even if objectives were attained, the markets' judgment continued. As the world economic 
activity in the 1930s, international trade and capital exports fell, the economies of countries having 
had the support of the League weakened. Similarly to any other country, the incentives to pursue 
orthodox economic policies decreased, aggravating the probability of default. Without rapid, powerful 
support, these loans were destined to fail. 
 On the other hand, the Leagues' own lack of capital impeded its potential capacity to act as a 
lender of last resort, an important contrast with today's IMF. The procedure followed by the League, 
however, had several advantages that were adapted to the situation of the 1920s —including the 
impossibility of suffering from moral hazard— when financial markets were in a position to invest if 
they were provided with trusty and profitable investment projects. The situation in the 1930s was 
different, with the internal shocks of borrowing countries being accompanied by shocks in the main 
financial centers of Europe and the US. When the Great Depression hit Europe, borrowing countries 
would have needed a kind of rapid assistance that the League was unable to provide. Still, the League 
continued to support countries in financial distress through the conception of stabilization programs 
and the planning of long-term loans, such as Austria's second guarantee loan in 1933. There is in fact a 
consensus among historians that countries such as Romania —which approached the League once its 
previous stabilization program failed— or Poland would have benefited from earlier collaboration 
with the League. In the 1930s, the financial conditions again deteriorated and worldwide defaults 
negatively affected any prospects for new investments —promoted or not by the League—. With the 
establishment of the Bank for International Settlements in 1930, a new institution complimented the 
League’s work through its historical trademark, the bridge loans, acting as a de facto lender of last 
resort. Foreign capital therefore continued to flow when it was urgently needed, and the League 
continued to operate on this and on the new challenges opening up before World War II.  
 
Sources 
Bank of England Archives, London; Archives de la Banque de France, Paris; Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York archives, New York; ING Baring Archives, London; League of Nations Archives, Geneva; 
The Morgan Library & Museum, New York. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. League of Nations' Loans.  
Country Year 
Total amount  
(in mill. £) 
Spread at 
issue (NY) Places of Issue Currencies 
Maturity 
(years) 
Moody's 
ratings 
Fee in 
NY 
Fee in 
London 
Underwriter 
in NY 
Underwriter in 
London 
Austria 1923 33.78 3.44 
Vienna, Paris, NY, Prague, 
Bruxelles, Geneva, 
Stockholm, Milan, Madrid, 
London, Amsterdam 
Dollar, Belgian franc, florins, 
sterling, Czech crowns, French 
francs, lire, pesetas, Swiss francs, 
Swedish crowns 20 A 4.96 2.23 JP Morgan Bank of England 
Hungary 1924 14.38 4.63 
NY, London, Geneva, 
Prague, Stockholm, 
Amsterdam, Hungary, Italy 
Sterling, dollar, lire, Swiss francs, 
Swedish crowns, Dutch florins, 
Czech crowns. 20 A 9.4 4.76 Speyer 
Baring, Rothschild and 
Schröder 
Greece 1924 21.0 3.99 US, London, Greece Dollar and Sterling 40 Baa 8.3 6.02 Speyer Hambro 
Danzig 1925 1.5 3.39(a) London Sterling 20 Baa -- 4.65 -- 
 
British Overseas Bank, 
Helbert Wagg 
Bulgaria 1926 3.3 4.05 
London (Milan, Zurich, 
Amsterdam), NY Dollar and Sterling 40 Baa 4.54 4.54 
Speyer, Blair, 
Schröder NY 
Ottoman Bank, 
Schröder and Stern 
Estonia 1927 1.5 4.07 London (Amsterdam), NY Sterling 40 Ba 4.13 3.28 
Hallgarten & 
Co. 
Midland Bank, British 
Foreign & Colonial 
Bank 
Danzig 1927 1.9 2.54(a) London (Amsterdam) Sterling 20 B -- 4.6 -- 
British Overseas Bank, 
Helbert Wagg 
Greece 1928 7.56 3.41 London, New York Dollar and Sterling 40 Baa 5.81 5.81 
National City 
Co. Hambro and Erlanger 
Bulgaria 1928 5.53 2.99 
London, (Amsterdam, 
Prague), New York, 
(Bruxelles, Milan, Zurich), 
Paris Dollar, Sterling, French francs 40 Baa 5.43 4.35 Speyer 
Ottoman Bank, 
Schröder, Stern, 
Czechoslovakian 
syndicate. 
Sources: Amounts, places of issue, maturities, underwriters and currencies are from League of Nations (1930) and Hofrat (1925). Underwriting fees are 
calculated directly from debt contracts and original documents. Spreads are our own computations from yield to maturity (ratio of interest rate to price at 
issue) and the yield of a long-term US treasury bond. Moody's ratings are from Flandreau et al. (2010) database. (a): London. 
Table 2. Other (reconstruction) loans in Eastern Europe. 
Country Year 
Total amount 
(in mill. £) 
Spread at issue 
(NY) Places of Issue Currencies 
Moody's 
ratings 
Fee in 
NY 
Fee in 
London 
Underwriter in 
NY 
Underwriter in 
London 
 
First issuers 
Czechoslovakia 1922 3.3 (L) 3.91 London , Prague and New York Dollar and Sterling Baa 7.22 5.49 Kuhn Loeb 
Baring, Rothschild 
and Schröder 
Poland 1925 10.28 4.53 New York Dollar Ba 10.14 -- Dillon, Read -- 
Poland 1927 12.9 4.5 
London, Paris, Amsterdam, 
Stockholm, Milan, Zurich and New 
York Dollar and Sterling Ba 6.98 6.98 Bankers Trust Lazard 
 
Previous defaulters 
Romania 1929 20.7 4.55 
NY (Milan, Berlin, Geneva, 
Bruxelles, Amsterdam, Romania, 
Vienna, Prague), London, 
Stockholm French francs, Dollar, Sterling Baa 4.18 7.69 Blair Hambro, Lazard 
 
Sources: Amounts, places of issue and currencies are from prospectuses published in The Times and The Economist. Underwriting fees for New York are 
from the database from Flandreau et al. (2010). For London it is ING Baring archives for Czechoslovakia and Meyer (1970) for Poland. Romania's loan 
information is from Ureche-Rangau (2008). We also used her original figures to estimate the fee for NY and London, based on total expenses less stamp duty 
in the UK. 
 Table 3. Correlation coefficients. 
 Austria Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Estonia Greece Hungaria Poland Serbia 
Austria 1.00 0.83 0.86 0.52 0.80 0.93 0.71 0.72 
Bulgaria 0.83 1.00 0.88 0.21 0.89 0.92 0.60 0.83 
Czechoslovakia 0.86 0.88 1.00 0.28 0.89 0.91 0.66 0.80 
Estonia 0.52 0.21 0.28 1.00 0.21 0.38 0.80 0.21 
Greece 0.80 0.89 0.89 0.21 1.00 0.88 0.61 0.92 
Hungaria 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.38 0.88 1.00 0.68 0.83 
Poland 0.71 0.60 0.66 0.80 0.61 0.68 1.00 0.62 
Serbia 0.72 0.83 0.80 0.21 0.92 0.83 0.62 1.00 
Correlation with: 
All countries 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.37 0.74 0.79 0.67 0.71 
League 
countries 0.77 0.71 0.76 0.33 0.70 0.78 0.68 0.70 
Other countries 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.43 0.81 0.81 0.64 0.71 
Sources: Own computations.  
Table 4. Principal component analysis (PCA) results. Factor loadings of the first and second principal 
components. All countries (Eastern Europe) 
 Principal 
Component 1 
Principal 
Component 2 
Eigenvalue 5.87 1.18 
Variance 
proportion 
0.73 0.15 
Cumulative 
proportion 
0.73 0.88 
 Eigenvectors: Vector 1 Vector 2 
Austria 0.38 0.06 
Bulgaria 0.39 -0.16 
Czechoslovakia 0.38 -0.18 
Estonia 0.22 0.72 
Greece 0.37 -0.27 
Hungary 0.39 -0.05 
Poland 0.31 0.50 
Serbia 0.35 -0.26 
Source: Own computations. 
Table 5. PCA results. League countries. 
 Principal 
Component 1 
Principal 
Component 2 
Eigenvalue 3.71 0.81 
Variance 
proportion 
0.76 0.16 
Cumulative 
proportion 
0.76 0.92 
 Eigenvectors: Vector 1 Vector 2 
Austria 0.48 0.06 
Bulgaria 0.48 -0.21 
Estonia 0.28 0.91 
Greece 0.45 -0.33 
Hungary 0.50 -0.07 
Source: Own computations. 
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Table 6. PCA results. Other Eastern European countries. 
Component Principal 
Component 1 
Principal 
Component 2 
Eigenvalue 2.41 0.42 
Variance 
proportion 
0.80 0.14 
Cumulative 
proportion 
0.80 0.94 
 Eigenvectors: Vector 1 Vector 2 
Czecoslovakia 0.59 -0.31 
Poland 0.54 0.83 
Serbia 0.58 -0.45 
Source: Own computations. 
Figure 1. Underwriting fees for Austria's 1923 loan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: See text. 
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Figure 2. Austria's loan absolute differences from issue prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' computations from data provided in Hofrat (1925). 
Figure 3. Hungary's loan underwriting fees. Sources: See text. 
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Figures 4 to 7. Financial markets' reactions to League's involvement in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Greece. 
Sources: Austria and Hungary: Neue Freie Presse and the Prager Blatt. Bulgaria and Greek bond 
prices are from the Investors' Monthly Manual. 
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Figure 8. Spreads of government bonds from Eastern European countries in the NY Stock market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
